ways that have been noticed by the scholars, whether medieval or modern, and that have split them into rival camps. But the reason for this is not that Aristotle really went one or the other way chosen by the scholars and just failed to make that sufficiently clear to the non-scholars. On the contrary, Aristotle left things unclear because he really thought they were unclear. So, unlike the scholars, he quite deliberately refrained from deciding which way to go. He exercised over himself, in other words, a certain degree of ascetical restraint. He was ready to decide questions where he thought he had evidence to go ondeterminative if he thought the evidence determinative, probable if he thought it probable. Where he thought he had no evidence, or where no solution rationally presented itself, he held back and kept a judicious silence. Perhaps he would have preferred to go one way rather than the other. But if so we cannot tell that from the texts he left us.
One immediate illustration of this relates to numbers 1), 2), 3), 6), and possibly 8) and 10) in Grisez's syllabus above, namely the apparent lack of a providential and personal god in Aristotle. One should say straight off that there was no lack of a providential and personal god or gods in the Greek thought of Aristotle's day, as the evidence of the great tragedians and the mystery religions makes very clear. So why does this not get reflected in Aristotle? An answer is already present in Xenophanes. The personal gods of pagan Greek religion are too irrational and too immoral to be worthy of belief or worship. If the philosopher is going to believe in a god, therefore, this god must be one that he can give some philosophical and not mythical ground for. Now the world itself provides such philosophical ground for the existence of such a god. For the world is not sufficient to explain itself; something else beyond it must be posited to explain it. This fact is the basis of the several cosmological arguments for the existence of a god (Grisez states one of them in his paper, p.7). But do these arguments establish indisputably that this god is a personal god, or that, if he is, he is also a providential god? I think not. But conversely neither do these arguments establish that this god is not personal and providential (unless one takes some modern or Averroist interpretation of them). They leave the question open. The wise philosopher then will refrain from saying or concluding anything that closes the question. He will say what he can and then shut up.
Another and more complex illustration relates to the problem of life after bodily death-which may or may not be part of what is being referred to in number 5) of Grisez's syllabus above. This is a problem, in fact, for any philosopher, and those who have tried to answer it on purely philosophical grounds have all, I think, fallen into error.
The problem is as follows. There is clearly in man a certain power or powers whose relation to the body is puzzling. I refer to reason and will or choice. If man is a physical being then these powers too, it would seem, should be physical and ultimately explicable in physical terms. This thought is, one might say, what drives contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind, where just about everyone is a physicalist. Or perhaps one should say that just about everyone wants to be a physicalist. For, if the truth be told, physicalism is more a hope than an achieved reality. No one has yet come up with a fully satisfying physicalist theory. I do not say this because philosophers cast doubt on each other's theories. I say it because they each cast doubt on their own theory. Some, to be sure, do think that they have got closer to a solution than others, but none thinks he has really cracked it. Indeed, in view of this phenomenon, at least one prominent philosopher of mind has declared that we are constitutionally incapable of coming up with any such theory (though that has not stopped him siding with physicalism in principle). 4 My own conviction is that the failure here is not due to some constitutional incapacity. It is due to the fact that physicalism is just an impossible doctrine. No matter how cleverly stated it may be, it is never going to make sense of the facts. and posit a soul as a second and independent substance alongside the body. When the body dies the soul and its powers survive and exist as such without need of or dependence on a body. But then, if we go this way, we make the connection between body and soul before death (when they are united) utterly mysterious. How are these two substances, body and soul, supposed to interact and how can they form the unity that we see man manifestly to be? There are no satisfactory answers to these questions. Dualism is as unbelievable a doctrine as physicalism.
The problem forces us to look for a notion of soul which 1) gives the soul a degree of being that transcends the physical and that grounds the non-physical powers, and yet 2) naturally ties the soul to the body so that the two form a single unity.
Aristotle's doctrine of the soul as form of the body is the only doctrine that provides any satisfactory answer here. For as form of the body, and so as actuality to potential, the soul and the body form as intrinsic a unity as do the shape and the clay of a statue. for me to repeat those criticisms here. I wish instead to raise some additional ones. They concern Grisez's claims about the incommensurability of human goods and therewith his criticism of the hierarchical theory of human goods adopted by Aristotle (and also by St.
Thomas Aquinas after him).
Grisez holds the view, or seems to hold the view, that if two goods are incommensurable then they are also incomparable. He seems to think, in other words, that if X and Y are really incommensurable then they cannot be compared at all and one of them cannot be said to be better or worse than another. For, as his argument seems to go, if X and Y were really comparable as better or worse then there would have to be some common measure according to which the comparison was being made. could be both incommensurable and yet comparable. For the intellectual pleasures are superior to the physical pleasures though they cannot be measured on the same scale.
Grisez might respond here that Mill was just deluded and that, for a utilitarian, the notion of different kinds or qualities of pleasure is incoherent. Some contemporary utilitarians might, in fact, agree with him on this point. 6 But let that be, since I have no interest in defending Mill. Let me say rather that Aristotle also distinguishes commensurability and comparability. At least he does so in a passage from the Politics which, if my interpretation of it is right, presents a perfectly clear and plausible account of that distinction.
In the passage in question (Politics 3.12: 1283a4-9) Aristotle is comparing different claims to rule. He raises the possibility that inequality in any good whatever (including color and size) could count as a superior claim to rule (so that, for instance, the fairer or taller should rule over the darker and shorter). He dismisses this view for several reasons, one of which is that it would make all goods commensurable (sumbleta). He illustrates his point using a dispute from pipe playing about who should be given the better pipes. The argument here is elliptical, but it can be expanded as follows. If a certain amount of size counts as more of a claim to pipes than a certain amount of skill or virtue in pipe playing, then by reducing the amount of the size one should eventually get to an amount that equals, in its claim to pipes, the original amount of skill. Hence, size and skill will be commensurable. Further, supposing also that a certain amount of wealth or freedom counts as more of a claim to pipes than that same amount of skill, then some lesser amount of both will, in claims to pipes, equal it. Hence they too will be commensurable with skill. But things equal to a third thing are equal to each other, hence the amount of wealth and freedom equal to the amount of skill will also equal the amount of size that was equal to it. Consequently all these goods will be commensurable with each other and with every other good that one allows to make claims to the pipes.
Aristotle regards it as obvious that all goods are not commensurable, yet he clearly also regards it as legitimate to say that some goods are better than others. At any rate he is prepared to say, for instance, that the goods of the soul are superior to those of the body, and that the virtues of the part of the soul that has reason are better than the virtues of the part of the soul that listens to reason (Politics 4(7). 1, 14: 1333a16-36).
What he means by this can, I think, be best explained as follows.
Goods are not commensurable because different goods are good with respect to different jobs or functions. The good of pipe playing is good with respect to the job of playing the pipes; the good of speed is good with respect to running and winning races; the good of political virtue is good with respect to ruling. These goods are clearly incommensurable in the sense that no amount of speed or political virtue is going to make up for a deficiency in musical skill when it comes to playing the pipes. Only skill in pipe playing is relevant here and only people competing on the basis of such skill can sensibly be measured against each other as regards better or worse. The other goods are simply irrelevant. Different goods, therefore, are incommensurable in that they are relevant for different jobs, and a good that counts for doing one job does not thereby count for doing some other and completely different job. But this does not mean that one cannot say, for
instance, that one of these incommensurable goods is better than another. For one can indeed do this by comparing, not how a good relevant for one job is better or worse with respect to that job than a good relevant for a different job, but how the different jobs compare to each other. Bridle making, for instance, is a lesser good than horse riding, not because someone skilled in horse riding will make a better bridle than someone skilled in bridle making, but because bridle making is for the sake of horse riding and not vice versa (Ethics 1.1). Likewise we can say that the body is for the sake of the soul and the parts of the body for the sake of the whole body.
While these goods are better or worse according to their place in the hierarchy, none of them is commensurable with any other in the sense that a greater amount of a lower good will make up for a deficiency in a higher good, or even that a lesser amount of a higher good will make up for a deficiency in a lower good. For instance, if one has a deficiency in horse riders one is not going to make up for it by recruiting twice as many bridle makers; nor is one going to make up for a deficiency in bridle makers by recruiting half as many horse riders-no matter how skilled the bridle makers or horse riders are.
Likewise the heart is better than the big toe because it is central to the functioning of the whole body while the big toe is peripheral. For a body can survive without a big toe but not without a heart. Yet a body cannot be perfect without a big toe. If the heart is made stronger, for instance, this does not make up for the loss of a big toe.
This fact is rather significant. It means that in a hierarchy of goods, while some are higher or better than others, none is more basic. On the contrary, all are equally basic, since, ex hypothesi, all are equally needed for the completion of the whole. Or at least this will be true of goods that are, as I shall say, organic to a given hierarchy as opposed to those that are merely instrumental. Take the body, for instance. The body is an organic hierarchy while bridle making and horse riding form an instrumental hierarchy. In an organic hierarchy all the parts are equally necessary for the integrity of the whole but not all the parts are equally important (as with the big toe and the heart). All the parts are also for their own sake as well as for the sake of the whole. Since the big toe is an integral part of the perfect body it belongs to the body in its own right and as such. It belongs, in other words, immediately to the idea of the body's perfection and of its complete functioning and not mediately or because of something else. The fact that it is less at the center of the body's perfection and functioning than the heart does not alter its independent place in that perfection and functioning.
The matter is a little different with goods that are instrumental to a given hierarchy, as opposed to those that are organic. Bridle making, for instance, is instrumental with respect to horse riding and medicine is such with respect to the body.
The exercise of medical skill that the body needs in order to be restored to health will no longer be needed once the body has been restored. The administering of curative measures stops at that point since the body can now function from within its own resources. Food and drink are also instrumental goods but ones that, unlike medical skill, are always needed. The reason in their case is that they become, after digestion, parts of the body and so pass over into the class of organic goods and do not remain simply instrumental. Or, to follow Aristotle, we might say that medicine is a tool for health but food is materials for health (Politics 1.3: 1256a5-10). Likewise with bridle making and horse riding. Bridles may be organic to horse riding (a horse cannot be ridden well without them), but bridle making is instrumental. If bridles never wore out or broke, then once enough of them had been made there would be no further need of bridle making.
Bridle making, we shall say, is like medicine, and bridles like food. Both bridles and bridle making are for the sake of horse riding, just like food and medicine are for the sake of health. But the "for the sake of relation" is different in each case. One, as I say, is organic and the other instrumental. For this reason, if for no other, we must say that Grisez's charge 9) is false as applied to organic hierarchies in Aristotle.
At all events, such an organic hierarchy is an instance of parts whose goodness is comparable but not commensurable. It is an instance of something that I think Grisez is committed to denying. For he wants to say about the human goods that they are all equally basic in a way that one cannot also say that one of them is better than another. Or at least one cannot say this prior to some choice one makes of which good to make more central to one's own life or which good to make the principle of any hierarchical ordering among goods. In other words, there is no natural hierarchy to the human goods, or a hierarchy that precedes choice, though there may be a personally created hierarchy that follows choice. The belief that there is such a natural hierarchy, which he rightly attributes to both Aristotle and Aquinas, he regards as a defect in their systems.
There seem to be a number of reasons for his holding that this is a defect. The primary or fundamental one is that the basic goods are, as he says, all equally ultimate as reasons for acting. Each is good in and of itself and not because of, or derivatively from, some other good (p. 10). But I think this reason is not decisive, for the hierarchical conception of goods that one finds in Aristotle and Aquinas is well able to accommodate it. For in this conception the several goods can still be considered ultimate as reasons for action. Life or survival, for instance, is a good to be pursued just as such even if it is also a good to be pursued for the sake of other and higher goods, namely the goods of the soul. And this remains true whether we are comparing these goods with each other or are comparing the prospective advantages of various instances of the same good in particular contexts (p.2 n.5, p.10 n.25). Instances of human goods, even though hierarchically subordinate to instances of goods higher up the scale, do not lose their own power of direct appeal to choice.
There are two additional reasons that seem also to be playing a role in Grisez's thinking here. The first of these concerns what is needed to reject proportionalism or consequentialism. The second concerns the question of human dignity. As regards the first, he holds that the right way to reject these moral theories is through the claims: a) that all the goods are incommensurable so that it is impossible to sum them into one calculation and compare the resulting states of affairs of different actions as better or worse; and b) that since all the goods are equally basic in the sense that none is, by nature at any rate, subordinate to or for the sake of another, it is always wrong to attack one for the sake of protecting another (as consequentialists sometimes say one should do).
But again I think the hierarchical conception of goods in Aristotle and Aquinas can accommodate these claims. It accommodates claim a) through its differentiating between incommensurability and incomparability. The human goods are incommensurable and so cannot be summed (in the way that consequentialists want); but they are nevertheless comparable and so can be said to be better or worse, higher or lower. It also accommodates claim b), or at least the conclusion of claim b), even though it does say that some goods are for the sake of others. The answer is basically this. The goods of the body, for instance, such as health and strength, are for the sake of the goods of the soul, so that one should prefer the latter to the former and be ready, in certain cases, to forego the former for the sake of the latter (as in fasting, celibacy, martyrdom, and so on). But, despite this natural subordination of the goods of the body to those of the soul, one may not directly destroy the goods of the body (say in suicide or euthanasia).
The reason is not that, through some inconsistency of thinking, the goods of the body are now being said not to be for the sake of soul so that one may not, after all, subordinate the former to the latter. Rather it is because here one's choice focuses on an evil and not on a good. To choose to suffer death from another rather than, say, deny the faith is not to choose the evil of death. It is to choose the good of faith. One should not be disturbed here by the fact that sometimes we do think it right deliberately to sacrifice, and not just to suffer the loss of, a lesser good for the sake of a greater good, as when we cut off a diseased big toe or even a leg to save the whole body.
For here it is crucial that the limb cut off is diseased or damaged in some way so that it is ceasing to function as a part of the body and is becoming a danger to the body. To remove a healthy part of the body which is posing no threat to the body is very different from removing a diseased part that is posing a threat. That is why, for instance, it is rational to remove a diseased or damaged womb to save the whole body but not rational to be sterilized so as to continue sex without having more children. whether Grisez is renewing or revolutionizing Christian ethics, I should say that he is doing both and neither. He is doing both in the sense that he has introduced a revolutionary theory (a theory that revolutionizes the tradition in rejecting hierarchy and comparability), and thereby a theory that may well serve also to renew the tradition, if only by provoking a thoughtful reaction. He is doing neither because his theory is not one
